ADM: hazardous attitudes, risk management, CRM and situational awareness
The short version
- About 80% of aviation accidents trace to HUMAN FACTORS, not mechanical failure. ADM exists to attack that number, and pilots given ADM training make 10-50% fewer judgement errors.
- The five HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES and their antidotes are the most heavily tested content in the section - learn them as matched pairs.
- A HAZARD is the condition or event; RISK is the value you assign to its potential impact. Not every hazard carries high risk.
- Memorise the acronyms - IMSAFE (personal fitness), PAVE (preflight risk), the 5 Ps, the 3 Ps, and DECIDE.
- The first step in neutralising a hazardous attitude is RECOGNISING that you are having the thought.
The concepts
What ADM is and why it exists 0:02:11
Aeronautical Decision Making is a systematic approach to the mental process pilots use to determine the best course of action in a given set of circumstances.
Roughly 80% of aviation accidents relate to HUMAN FACTORS.
Most manned-aircraft accidents occur during takeoff and landing, closest to the ground. A drone is ALWAYS close to the ground.
ADM was introduced by the airline industry about 25 years ago; pilots receiving ADM training make 10-50% fewer judgement errors.
The decision-making steps - identify personal attitudes, learn behaviour modification techniques, learn to recognise and cope with stress, develop risk assessment skills, use all available resources, and evaluate your own ADM effectiveness.
Commercial operations raise the stakes over hobby flying - people, structures and moving vehicles enter the picture.
Crew Resource Management 0:08:15
The effective use of ALL available resources - human, hardware and information - before and during flight to achieve a safe outcome.
Three resource categories - HUMAN (crew, visual observers), HARDWARE (aircraft, controllers, equipment), INFORMATION (weather, charts, airspace, performance).
Most of the value is gathered BEFORE the flight, in research and briefing.
The instructor's campus shoot example - hours of planning so that on shoot day the only task left is flying.
Single-Pilot Resource Management 0:10:06
Managing all available resources when operating alone - the normal case for most commercial drone work.
Components - decision making, RISK management, TASK management, AUTOMATION management, controlled-flight-into-terrain awareness, and SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
AUTOMATION MANAGEMENT - an automated mapping mission demands MORE vigilance, not less. The instructor finds it more stressful than manual flight.
CFIT for drones - an automated mission at a set AGL flying into rising terrain. The aircraft is under control the whole time, which is what makes it CFIT.
Situational awareness is the last skill students acquire, and it comes with experience.
Automation management is almost more stressful to me than it is manual flying, because now I have to rely on the computer and make sure that the computer works correctly.0:10:06
Hazard versus risk 0:14:57
A HAZARD is a real or perceived condition, event or circumstance you encounter. RISK is the value assigned to the potential impact of that hazard.
The same hazard carries different risk depending on circumstances.
The instructor's running example - a helicopter along the beach is the HAZARD. At 500 ft while you are at 100 ft the risk is low; at 100 ft while you are at 200 ft the risk becomes severe.
Not all hazards are high risk, but every hazard needs a risk value assigned.
The five hazardous attitudes and their antidotes 0:16:28
Five recognised attitudes that degrade decision quality, each with a prescribed antidote.
ANTI-AUTHORITY - 'Don't tell me what to do.' ANTIDOTE - Follow the rules, they are usually right.
IMPULSIVITY - 'Do something quickly!' ANTIDOTE - Not so fast, think first.
INVULNERABILITY - 'It won't happen to me.' ANTIDOTE - It could happen to me.
MACHO - 'I can do it.' ANTIDOTE - Taking chances is foolish.
RESIGNATION - 'What's the use?' ANTIDOTE - I'm not helpless, I can make a difference.
The FIRST step in neutralising any of them is RECOGNISING you are having the thought.
The instructor notes macho is the attitude most often present in accidents, and that it is not gender-specific.
Resignation applied to drones - a lost-link aircraft is not automatically gone. Move position, climb a hill, restore line of sight.
The way that I call this one is, hold my beer and watch this. Famous last words.0:16:28
Fly that wreckage to the ground.0:16:28
The IMSAFE checklist 0:22:41
A personal fitness-for-flight self-assessment.
ILLNESS - am I sick?
MEDICATION - am I taking anything that impairs me?
STRESS - psychological pressure, money, family, health worries.
ALCOHOL - am I under the influence?
FATIGUE - am I tired?
EMOTION / EATING - am I emotionally upset?
ONLY the pilot can determine their own fitness to fly for a given flight.
Risk assessment - severity against likelihood 0:22:41
Risk is assessed by combining the SEVERITY of an outcome with the LIKELIHOOD of it occurring.
Severity runs catastrophic / critical / marginal / negligible.
Likelihood runs probable / occasional / remote / improbable.
A catastrophic-and-probable combination demands immediate action; a negligible outcome barely matters however likely.
The 16-hour-duty example - asked if they are too tired, the pilot will almost always say no. The assessment must be objective.
The risk management process and its four principles 0:26:38
A repeating loop - identify the hazard, assess the risk, analyse the controls, make control decisions, use the controls, then supervise and re-evaluate.
FOUR PRINCIPLES - accept no unnecessary risk; make risk decisions at the appropriate level; accept risk when benefits outweigh costs; integrate risk management into planning at all levels.
Appropriate level means matched to YOUR experience - a new pilot and a veteran should reach different decisions on the same scenario.
The cost/benefit test - flying into a tunnel to look around is unnecessary risk; flying into it to find a missing person may not be.
The loop repeats if the first control does not resolve the hazard.
In practice the whole loop should run in seconds, not on paper.
The PAVE checklist 0:29:15
A preflight risk assessment across four categories.
PILOT - use IMSAFE.
AIRCRAFT - is it airworthy, and do you know its limitations?
ENVIRONMENT - weather, terrain, airspace, obstacles, traffic.
EXTERNAL PRESSURES - deadlines, client expectations, operational pitfalls.
Should be run before EVERY flight, not just complex ones.
The 5 Ps, 3 Ps and DECIDE models 0:34:35
Three structured frameworks for working through a decision.
5 Ps - Plan, Plane (aircraft), Pilot, Passengers (read as crew / visual observers), Programming (automated mission setup).
3 Ps - Perceive, Process, Perform, used together with PAVE.
DECIDE - Detect a change, Estimate the need to react, Choose a desirable outcome, Identify actions, Do the action, Evaluate the effect.
The instructor prefers the 3 Ps for speed and finds DECIDE too long for real time.
AUTOMATIC / NATURALISTIC decision making - experts imagine one course of action immediately rather than weighing alternatives. Built by scenario-based practice.
The realistic failure mode is FREEZING, not choosing badly. Rehearsal prevents it.
Operational pitfalls 0:40:54
Recognised traps that lead capable pilots into accidents.
PEER PRESSURE - being goaded into an unsafe act.
MIND SET - being locked into a plan and unable to adapt.
SCUD RUNNING - pressing on beneath lowering cloud to get the shot.
CONTINUING VFR INTO INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS - for a drone, losing visual line of sight in cloud or poor visibility.
GETTING BEHIND THE AIRCRAFT - sport mode outrunning your reactions.
LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS - flying the screen and losing the aircraft.
OPERATING WITHOUT ADEQUATE BATTERY - the instructor admits doing this once.
FLYING OUTSIDE THE ENVELOPE - CG or weight beyond limits.
NEGLECT OF CHECKLISTS - the gimbal cover left on is the classic.
Stress management 0:45:53
Stress effects are CUMULATIVE and degrade performance and decision quality.
ACUTE stress is short-term and situational; CHRONIC stress is long-term and warrants professional help - and is not compatible with flying.
Mitigations - relaxation, physical fitness, and time management.
Building slack into the mission schedule is itself a stress control.
Situational awareness and the sterile cockpit 0:47:07
Accurate perception and understanding of all the factors affecting the aircraft and crew during a given period.
Degraded by fatigue, stress, work overload and DISTRACTION.
A visual observer materially improves situational awareness on complex operations.
STERILE COCKPIT - during critical phases, conversation is restricted to the operation. The instructor recommends applying this to drone crews.
Bystanders are a predictable distraction; have a plan or a crew member to handle them.
Common accident factors 0:50:00
The recurring causes behind aviation accidents, each applicable to sUAS.
Inadequate preflight preparation and planning.
Failure to maintain control of the aircraft.
Failure to see and avoid other traffic or objects.
Mismanagement of fuel or battery.
Improper in-flight decisions and planning.
Misjudgement of distance and speed.
Selection of unsuitable terrain for landing.
Improper operation of the flight controls.
Every concept, three clicks deep
The same concepts as a quick reference: the closed row is the glance, open is the study card, and every timestamp jumps into the recording.
01What ADM is and why it existsAeronautical Decision Making is a systematic approach to the mental process pilots use to determine the bes…0:02:11›
Aeronautical Decision Making is a systematic approach to the mental process pilots use to determine the best course of action in a given set of circumstances.
Roughly 80% of aviation accidents relate to HUMAN FACTORS.
Most manned-aircraft accidents occur during takeoff and landing, closest to the ground. A drone is ALWAYS close to the ground.
ADM was introduced by the airline industry about 25 years ago; pilots receiving ADM training make 10-50% fewer judgement errors.
The decision-making steps - identify personal attitudes, learn behaviour modification techniques, learn to recognise and cope with stress, develop risk assessment skills, use all available resources, and evaluate your own ADM effectiveness.
Commercial operations raise the stakes over hobby flying - people, structures and moving vehicles enter the picture.
02Crew Resource ManagementThe effective use of ALL available resources - human, hardware and information - before and during flight t…0:08:15›
The effective use of ALL available resources - human, hardware and information - before and during flight to achieve a safe outcome.
Three resource categories - HUMAN (crew, visual observers), HARDWARE (aircraft, controllers, equipment), INFORMATION (weather, charts, airspace, performance).
Most of the value is gathered BEFORE the flight, in research and briefing.
The instructor's campus shoot example - hours of planning so that on shoot day the only task left is flying.
03Single-Pilot Resource ManagementManaging all available resources when operating alone - the normal case for most commercial drone work.0:10:06›
Managing all available resources when operating alone - the normal case for most commercial drone work.
Components - decision making, RISK management, TASK management, AUTOMATION management, controlled-flight-into-terrain awareness, and SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.
AUTOMATION MANAGEMENT - an automated mapping mission demands MORE vigilance, not less. The instructor finds it more stressful than manual flight.
CFIT for drones - an automated mission at a set AGL flying into rising terrain. The aircraft is under control the whole time, which is what makes it CFIT.
Situational awareness is the last skill students acquire, and it comes with experience.
04Hazard versus riskA HAZARD is a real or perceived condition, event or circumstance you encounter.0:14:57›
A HAZARD is a real or perceived condition, event or circumstance you encounter. RISK is the value assigned to the potential impact of that hazard.
The same hazard carries different risk depending on circumstances.
The instructor's running example - a helicopter along the beach is the HAZARD. At 500 ft while you are at 100 ft the risk is low; at 100 ft while you are at 200 ft the risk becomes severe.
Not all hazards are high risk, but every hazard needs a risk value assigned.
05The five hazardous attitudes and their antidotesFive recognised attitudes that degrade decision quality, each with a prescribed antidote.0:16:28›
Five recognised attitudes that degrade decision quality, each with a prescribed antidote.
ANTI-AUTHORITY - 'Don't tell me what to do.' ANTIDOTE - Follow the rules, they are usually right.
IMPULSIVITY - 'Do something quickly!' ANTIDOTE - Not so fast, think first.
INVULNERABILITY - 'It won't happen to me.' ANTIDOTE - It could happen to me.
MACHO - 'I can do it.' ANTIDOTE - Taking chances is foolish.
RESIGNATION - 'What's the use?' ANTIDOTE - I'm not helpless, I can make a difference.
The FIRST step in neutralising any of them is RECOGNISING you are having the thought.
The instructor notes macho is the attitude most often present in accidents, and that it is not gender-specific.
Resignation applied to drones - a lost-link aircraft is not automatically gone. Move position, climb a hill, restore line of sight.
06The IMSAFE checklistA personal fitness-for-flight self-assessment.0:22:41›
A personal fitness-for-flight self-assessment.
ILLNESS - am I sick?
MEDICATION - am I taking anything that impairs me?
STRESS - psychological pressure, money, family, health worries.
ALCOHOL - am I under the influence?
FATIGUE - am I tired?
EMOTION / EATING - am I emotionally upset?
ONLY the pilot can determine their own fitness to fly for a given flight.
07Risk assessment - severity against likelihoodRisk is assessed by combining the SEVERITY of an outcome with the LIKELIHOOD of it occurring.0:22:41›
Risk is assessed by combining the SEVERITY of an outcome with the LIKELIHOOD of it occurring.
Severity runs catastrophic / critical / marginal / negligible.
Likelihood runs probable / occasional / remote / improbable.
A catastrophic-and-probable combination demands immediate action; a negligible outcome barely matters however likely.
The 16-hour-duty example - asked if they are too tired, the pilot will almost always say no. The assessment must be objective.
08The risk management process and its four principlesA repeating loop - identify the hazard, assess the risk, analyse the controls, make control decisions, use…0:26:38›
A repeating loop - identify the hazard, assess the risk, analyse the controls, make control decisions, use the controls, then supervise and re-evaluate.
FOUR PRINCIPLES - accept no unnecessary risk; make risk decisions at the appropriate level; accept risk when benefits outweigh costs; integrate risk management into planning at all levels.
Appropriate level means matched to YOUR experience - a new pilot and a veteran should reach different decisions on the same scenario.
The cost/benefit test - flying into a tunnel to look around is unnecessary risk; flying into it to find a missing person may not be.
The loop repeats if the first control does not resolve the hazard.
In practice the whole loop should run in seconds, not on paper.
09The PAVE checklistA preflight risk assessment across four categories.0:29:15›
A preflight risk assessment across four categories.
PILOT - use IMSAFE.
AIRCRAFT - is it airworthy, and do you know its limitations?
ENVIRONMENT - weather, terrain, airspace, obstacles, traffic.
EXTERNAL PRESSURES - deadlines, client expectations, operational pitfalls.
Should be run before EVERY flight, not just complex ones.
10The 5 Ps, 3 Ps and DECIDE modelsThree structured frameworks for working through a decision.0:34:35›
Three structured frameworks for working through a decision.
5 Ps - Plan, Plane (aircraft), Pilot, Passengers (read as crew / visual observers), Programming (automated mission setup).
3 Ps - Perceive, Process, Perform, used together with PAVE.
DECIDE - Detect a change, Estimate the need to react, Choose a desirable outcome, Identify actions, Do the action, Evaluate the effect.
The instructor prefers the 3 Ps for speed and finds DECIDE too long for real time.
AUTOMATIC / NATURALISTIC decision making - experts imagine one course of action immediately rather than weighing alternatives. Built by scenario-based practice.
The realistic failure mode is FREEZING, not choosing badly. Rehearsal prevents it.
11Operational pitfallsRecognised traps that lead capable pilots into accidents.0:40:54›
Recognised traps that lead capable pilots into accidents.
PEER PRESSURE - being goaded into an unsafe act.
MIND SET - being locked into a plan and unable to adapt.
SCUD RUNNING - pressing on beneath lowering cloud to get the shot.
CONTINUING VFR INTO INSTRUMENT CONDITIONS - for a drone, losing visual line of sight in cloud or poor visibility.
GETTING BEHIND THE AIRCRAFT - sport mode outrunning your reactions.
LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS - flying the screen and losing the aircraft.
OPERATING WITHOUT ADEQUATE BATTERY - the instructor admits doing this once.
FLYING OUTSIDE THE ENVELOPE - CG or weight beyond limits.
NEGLECT OF CHECKLISTS - the gimbal cover left on is the classic.
12Stress managementStress effects are CUMULATIVE and degrade performance and decision quality.0:45:53›
Stress effects are CUMULATIVE and degrade performance and decision quality.
ACUTE stress is short-term and situational; CHRONIC stress is long-term and warrants professional help - and is not compatible with flying.
Mitigations - relaxation, physical fitness, and time management.
Building slack into the mission schedule is itself a stress control.
13Situational awareness and the sterile cockpitAccurate perception and understanding of all the factors affecting the aircraft and crew during a given per…0:47:07›
Accurate perception and understanding of all the factors affecting the aircraft and crew during a given period.
Degraded by fatigue, stress, work overload and DISTRACTION.
A visual observer materially improves situational awareness on complex operations.
STERILE COCKPIT - during critical phases, conversation is restricted to the operation. The instructor recommends applying this to drone crews.
Bystanders are a predictable distraction; have a plan or a crew member to handle them.
14Common accident factorsThe recurring causes behind aviation accidents, each applicable to sUAS.0:50:00›
The recurring causes behind aviation accidents, each applicable to sUAS.
Inadequate preflight preparation and planning.
Failure to maintain control of the aircraft.
Failure to see and avoid other traffic or objects.
Mismanagement of fuel or battery.
Improper in-flight decisions and planning.
Misjudgement of distance and speed.
Selection of unsuitable terrain for landing.
Improper operation of the flight controls.
Tools referenced
| Tool | Coverage | Moment | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, chapter 2 | mentioned | 0:00:00 | The ADM chapter these concepts come from. |
| FAA-H-8083-22 Remote Pilot Study Guide, chapter 6 | mentioned | 0:00:00 | |
| Personal checklists | mentioned | 0:00:00 | The instructor strongly recommends building an aircraft-specific preflight checklist rather than relying on memory. |
Session materials
Archived locally on V: — click to open. Companion pages link to the LMS.
Action items
Resources mentioned
- docAudio review - ADM (MP3) 0:56:33
Extraction notes
This page was built from an auto-generated transcript, which garbles product and people's names. Those were corrected silently in everything above and logged here for transparency. The warnings flag claims that were true on the recording day but change fast.
Transcript corrections applied
| The transcript says | The trainer actually means |
|---|---|
| FA / EFA | FAA |
| PHAC / p-hack | PHAK (Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge) |
| AMSAFE | IMSAFE |
| pay-for / five piece | PAVE and "five Ps" |
| entire authority | ANTI-AUTHORITY |
| in resignation | and resignation |
| scut running | SCUD running |
| Pirate Lounge | pilot lounge |
| ADM, automatic decision making | Aeronautical Decision Making - the instructor conflates the acronym with "automatic decision making" when describing the naturalistic model |
| crash in Buffalo, New York ... back in 2001 | the Colgan Air crash at Buffalo was FEBRUARY 2009; the 2001 reference is an error in the lecture |
| deep you | dew point (garbled) |
True on recording day — verify before relying
- The last US commercial airline crash was Buffalo, New York, in 2001. - STATUS: INCORRECT AS STATED. The Colgan Air Flight 3407 crash near Buffalo was February 2009. The teaching point (US commercial aviation is extremely safe) stands.
- 80% of aviation accidents are human-factors related; ADM training reduces judgement errors by 10-50%. - STATUS: Long-standing FAA figures repeated in the PHAK. Directionally stable; treat the precise percentages as approximate.
- Hazardous attitudes, antidotes, IMSAFE, PAVE, DECIDE, 5 Ps, 3 Ps. - STATUS: STABLE - these are fixed ACS/PHAK constructs and are examined verbatim.